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INTRODUCTION
Businesses are usually very keen to participate in the governance of their 
markets (Lazega and Mounier, 2002, 2003; Falconi et al., 2005). In this 
chapter, we combine a sociological perspective on joint governance of 
markets with an economic perspective, such as that of Dixit (2009) that 
deals with issues of social optimality of private or public governance 
and enforcement institutions. Institutional and neo- institutional eco-
nomic theory often separate official governance institutions from private 
self- governance (Greif, 1996; Ellickson, 1991; Milgrom et al., 1990; 
Williamson, 1985). At the inter- organizational level, at least two different 
sociological traditions also deal with the issue of self and exogenous gov-
ernance of markets, comparing the formal and often exogenous aspects 
with informal and endogenous ones.
In the socio- legal approach, exogenous governance (see for example 
Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Hawkins, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984; 
Shapiro, 1984; Weait, 1993; Weaver, 1977) is provided by government 
agencies backed up by courts. These studies focus, for example, on the 
decision by government agencies to prosecute deviant companies. Such 
decisions are not straightforward and may often be endogenous outcomes 
of the interaction between official inspectors and company managers. This 
is especially the case when strict enforcement of the law is associated with 
large risks emanating from large- scale losses and layoffs, and sometimes 
bankruptcy.
The second tradition focuses on self- governance mechanisms usually 
legitimated by state backing – that is, on inter- firm arrangements that 
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provide self- governance and informal conflict- resolution mechanisms that 
govern inter- firm and firm- stakeholder transactions. Because litigation 
is costly, firms usually prefer unofficial dispute resolution whenever pos-
sible, especially when they have long- term continuing relationships (see 
for example Macaulay, 1963, 1986; Raub and Weesie, 1993, 2000; Rooks 
et al., 2000; Buskens et al., 2003); or as Dixit (2009) has indicated, when 
private- ordering governance institutions evolve to replace formal govern-
ance institutions that may sometimes be less efficient. Here the focus is on 
pressures to conform and the latter is shaped by resource dependencies, 
inter- dependence and reputation. Thus, these two traditions focus on dif-
ferent kinds of actors intervening in governance, the state and companies 
themselves – the latter sometimes through industry representatives.
In reality, the two forms of governance systems coalesce in various 
ways. One possible combination is Ayres and Braithwaite’s ‘responsive 
self- governance’ (1992), acknowledging the existence of ‘enforcement 
pyramids’ that exist between governmental regulatory agencies and cor-
porate actors and provide the opportunity to escalate from persuasion to 
warning letters to civil fines and criminal penalties to license suspension 
and revocation. Actors are aware of such enforcement pyramids, and 
know that an escalation can be triggered. This is why, in spite of costs, 
firms do use litigation both as plaintiffs and as defendants (Galanter and 
Epp, 1992; Dunworth and Rogers, 1996; Cheit and Gersen, 2000), and 
conflicts follow the disputing pyramid transforming informal complaints 
into court filings and formal judiciary decisions (Felstiner et al., 1980).
We further explore the idea that the two forms of governance are con-
nected and that there can be ‘joint’ governance or a combined regime of 
endogenous and exogenous business conflict resolution. This can take 
many hybrid forms, and the joint element is defined as the coexistence of 
several sources of constraint, both external and internal, that weigh on 
the actors in charge of solving conflicts and enforcing rules. Specifically, 
we identify a form of joint governance in the case of a ‘consular’ court 
in which judges are business people elected by their peers, and serve as 
unpaid volunteers.
Courts are not static institutions making a- temporal and purely rational 
decisions (Heydebrand and Seron, 1990; Wheeler et al., 1988). Rather, 
they constitute a contested terrain, the prize or object of broader economic 
competition and conflict that occur outside them (Flemming, 1998). This 
is especially the case in consular courts, where judges can be regarded both 
as official third parties upholding legal rules and procedures in conflict res-
olution processes; and as unofficial and potential levers of influence repre-
senting their industry of origin, thereby possibly favouring outcomes that 
do not hurt the interests of this industry. As levers, they can sometimes 
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weigh on judicial decisions directly, or do so indirectly by gaining other 
judges’ consent on specific outcomes.
Thinking about joint governance in these terms follows both an organi-
zational and a broadly conceived organizational and structural approach 
to economic institutions (Lazega and Mounier, 2002, 2003; Dixit, 2009) in 
which network analysis is used to study actors’ resource interdependencies.1 
We use this twofold perspective to contribute to the study of economic and 
legal institutions that combine exogenous and self- governance of markets. 
On the basis of an empirical network survey combined with a jurisprudential 
study, we examine the first commercial court in France, a consular court to 
which the state delegates conflict- resolution powers with respect to inter- 
company disputes. This case provides insight into particular interests’ efforts 
to shape the forum in which disputes between businesses are processed.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we describe 
the system of joint governance that French consular courts represent, 
outline the tension between particular interests and the general interest, 
explain how advice network data can provide insight and present our 
fieldwork. We then provide details of our jurisprudential study, focusing 
on judges’ attitudes in a case of conflict between minority shareholders 
and the board of a company, which we use to measure judges’ degree of 
pro- interventionism in the internal affairs of a firm. The following section 
presents the stochastic actor- oriented model of network dynamics that we 
use and our results; the final section sums up and concludes.
THE COMMERCIAL COURT OF PARIS
For five centuries, the French solution to the problem of ensuring business 
conflict resolution and market discipline has consisted in the government 
sharing its judiciary power with the business community through consular 
commercial courts.2 They represent a form of integration of business in the 
state apparatus in that judges are voluntary business people, elected for 
two to four years (for a maximum total of 14 years) by sitting judges and 
members of the Chamber of Commerce of their local jurisdiction.
Judges sit in judgment one day a week in matters of commercial 
litigation and bankruptcy.3 As in any other court, their decisions can be 
challenged and brought to the Court of Appeal, where judges are career 
magistrates typically trained at Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature. That 
challenges are relatively infrequent (about five per cent of cases) allows 
these consular courts to claim that this combination of external and self- 
governance of local business communities is ‘efficient’.
Judges include retired businesspeople4 as well as more junior prof es-
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sionals, whether bankers, lawyers, or consultants, who seek experience, 
status and social contacts, sometimes on behalf of their employer –who 
keeps paying their salary one day a week while they are practicing at the 
court. Sitting as a lay judge helps younger members build their relational 
capital (as explicitly suggested in the flyers aiming to attract new candida-
cies) and opens doors for future positions in economic institutions namely 
the Chamber of Commerce, arbitration courts and the Conseil économique 
et social, an advisory board to the Prime Minister. Serving at the commer-
cial court has traditionally been considered a ‘chore’ to be rewarded later on 
with such positions (Lemercier, 2003); further, lucrative contracts and mis-
sions are sometimes given on a discretionary basis by the acting president 
of the court to former judges to advise companies on a ‘preventive’ basis.
Consular courts are widely thought to be a cheaper and faster form of 
justice than a system with professional judges. Business bears more of the 
costs of its own governance, so that backlogs and waiting time are reduced 
relative to other courts; for example, there is neither jurisprudence, nor 
published cases. Another alleged advantage of this arrangement is that by 
their own business experience, lay judges are more likely than professional 
judges – who are civil servants – to understand the problems of entre-
preneurs and to monitor satisfactorily the behaviour of company direc-
tors, particularly in cases of insolvency and bankruptcy (Carruthers and 
Halliday, 1998). Finally, lay judges are more likely to be familiar with idi-
osyncratic norms and customs (called usages in French commercial courts) 
based on traditional industry subcultures and contributing to organizing 
business practice, but often ignored in business law. Lay judges are thought 
to be in a better position to fine- tune norms and customs to unstable or 
changing business environments, and to foster regulatory innovations.
Thus French commercial courts have features that bring to light impor-
tant aspects of the link between legal (exogenous) and social (endogenous) 
mechanisms in the governance of business. The state does not enforce and 
sanction alone, but requires the participation and adherence of individual 
and corporate actors. In effect in this case, elected representatives perform 
a function usually considered to be a state function, although they may 
also represent corporatist interests. This form of joint governance can be 
understood as industry self- governance with some oversight and ratifica-
tion by the State (Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986).
Consular Judges Between General and Particular Interests
The main challenge facing the system is the potentially difficult separa-
tion between general and particularistic interests. The institution officially 
assumes that judges will be entirely dedicated to their public mission; and 
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judges themselves declare that once elected, they feel independent from 
their industry of origin and fully impartial. In principle, this is consist-
ent with the business community’s need for speed and decisiveness, a low 
number of appeals, sharp segregation of politics and personal patron-
age from judicial decision- making and as much neutrality as possible. 
However, the public has always suspected that elections of judges are 
politicized so that they then fail to distance themselves from their virtual 
‘constituency’, the industry that endorsed their candidacy for the job. 
Especially in small towns, litigants’ confidence in the impartiality of local 
commercial courts is often impaired.5
Indeed consular courts are sometimes thought to offer sectors of the 
business community, led by their syndicats patronaux (employers’ associa-
tions) the opportunity to represent, or even to prevent damage to, the inter-
ests of their industry. Being at the court is a way of defending the customs 
of an occupation or profession. For example, the financial industry sees 
arrangements for corporate liquidation or administration as very impor-
tant to its practice of commercial lending. Bankers could easily handle 
their affairs concerning corporate rehabilitation outside of courts if they 
perceive them as incompetent or opposed to their interests. Courts must 
often conform to the expectations of the financial industry or lose much of 
their business (Carruthers and Halliday, 1998: 488). The ‘quality of justice’ 
as defined by the financial industry (limiting risk and permitting failures, 
or extending credit and aid reconstruction) is a significant factor in its 
strategy. Representation at the court also signals to the constituency that 
the leaders of their syndicat are promoting the interests of the profession.
Thus from the perspective of each industry, consular judges are some-
times seen as judicial entrepreneurs (McIntosh and Cates, 1997) repre-
senting the sensitivity of the syndicats patronaux and organized interests 
that helped them into the courthouse in the first place by endorsing their 
candidacy. They are entrepreneurs because they are expected to identify 
problems and support solutions that make sense in their own business 
community – although judges themselves are often uncomfortable with 
the idea of being ‘representatives’ with a mandate from a specific industry.
Industry has attempted to influence courts in various ways. Flemming 
(1998) lists five such ways: jurisdiction (the range of disputes over which the 
court has authority), positions (actors formally authorized to participate in 
the disposition of cases), resources (the capacity to influence the decisions 
of other actors), discretion (the range of choices available to actors) and 
procedures (rules governing courtroom processes). Parties involved in that 
contest are not always directly involved in all the conflicts that are dealt 
with by the court, but they may have indirect concerns, material or sym-
bolic, in the decisions of the court, which explains their efforts to influence.
Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13025 - EE - UGUR:M2691 - UGUR PRINT
 Norms, advice networks and joint economic governance  51
Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13025 - EE - UGUR:M2691 - UGUR PRINT
Legal systems are often designed to protect judges from external influ-
ences, for instance through well- defined procedures and an appropriate 
system to manage conflicts of interest. However, these forms of protection 
are less likely to be effective in the case of elected judges than with career 
judges.
Over- representation of the banking and financial industry among the judges
In principle, this system of joint governance is more efficient when judges 
represent as many sectors as possible, so that they can bring in experi-
ence and expertise in various areas of economic activity. Indeed all the 
syndicats patronaux are allowed to present candidates to the elections of 
consular judges, but some sectors do so more systematically than others: 
the banking and financial industry is by far the most active, followed by 
services and construction.
These three industries are traditionally very litigious (Cheit and Gersen, 
2000). The business docket in France is dominated by contract disputes 
and debt collection issues. A sizable portion of this docket involves the 
financial industry, for example in cases involving high levels of credit, 
thereby providing a strong incentive for it to invest in ‘judicial entrepre-
neurship’ (McIntosh and Cates, 1997). It also involves the construction 
industry which is structured as a cascade of subcontracting deals with 
strong incentives for conflict. These industries have high amounts of 
resources at stake in these conflicts. They are willing to play for the rules 
and endeavour to influence the court so as to impose their norms and prac-
tices over those of other industries. Their priorities can thus be defended in 
both the litigation and the bankruptcy benches.
The banking and financial industry is over- represented at the Commercial 
Court of Paris. When we conducted our fieldwork, from 2000 to 2005, it 
represented 3 per cent of the active population in France6 and 5.1 per cent in 
Paris.7 In terms of value added to the economy per branch (chained prices 
for previous year, 1995 basis), the share of the financial industry in the total 
value added to the French economy was 5.3 per cent.8 However at the same 
time, about one third of judges at the Commercial Court of Paris were from 
the financial and banking industry. In addition, judges from the banking 
and financial sector often have a formal legal education: about 60 per cent 
of them had a law degree at the time of our fieldwork, a much higher per-
centage than representatives of other industries. This suggests that judges 
coming from the financial sector are potential levers of that industry and 
that their influence on others may threaten the court’s independence.
Why do other industries fail to invest as much in judicial entrepreneur-
ship? One reason is that some very large companies prefer arbitration 
which is more discreet and avoids publicity. Another reason is that smaller 
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syndicats, such as retail, do not have the necessary clout, resources and 
organization to lobby effectively.
Advice networks of judges and decision- making
The fact that one- third of the judges come from the financial industry does 
not mean that they make one- third of the decisions in the court. Because 
most decisions are made by a collegial body of at least three members, 
bankers may participate either in much less or in much more than one- 
third of the decisions. An indirect way to capture their influence is through 
advice interactions between judges – that is, sets of relations through 
which they share knowledge, ideas, values and guidance – which can be 
taken to set the premises of judicial decisions.
Premise setting for judicial decision- making is at the core of our 
approach of micro- level knowledge sharing. Solutions to problems ulti-
mately depend on how these problems are initially defined or framed, that 
is, how certain dimensions of a problem are highlighted while others are 
downplayed (Lindenberg, 1998; Lazega, 1992). Definitions of a problem 
that gain early acceptance among members of an organization, also 
including judges in a courthouse, are likely to subsequently dominate in 
the search of a solution. Indeed sentencing is often shaped by the kind of 
information that is included in pre- sentence reports, which cover precisely 
the definition of the situation and the framing of the problem. Some judges 
have the status and authority to have their views taken seriously from the 
very beginning, and they can be decisive with respect to who is likely to 
win. The extent to which they are in a position to exert such an influence 
depends on how they have carved out a place for themselves within the 
court. Theories of social exchange have stressed how the circulation of 
intangible or immaterial resources such as knowledge is closely tied to 
status games (Blau, 1964; Lazega, 1992): they thus suggest that reaching 
influential positions largely depends on judges’ interactions with their 
colleagues, and thus on the functioning of the court as a community of 
members. In this perspective, patterns of advice seeking in the court show 
who is prepared to listen to whom when framing and defining problems in 
the judicial decision- making process.
Another way to see the importance of advice networks is to conceive of 
the court as a form of collective competence in which members, coming 
from diverse professional backgrounds, pool and share their experi-
ence and expertise in order to cope with a broad range of cases, some 
of them very complex. This is consistent with the sociological view of 
competence as a distributed, capitalized property in a process of collec-
tive learning, rather than as a purely individual capacity. Mutualization 
of competence can be seen as a form of corporate social capital (Leenders 
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and Gabbay, 1999) and includes both formal and informal consultations 
among judges.9 Formally, the deliberation procedure obviously provides 
opportunities to share knowledge; informally, judges also consult with one 
another intensely in areas of law and economics that they may not master 
equally well. While data about formal deliberations are not available, 
advice networks can still be mapped to provide insight into the informal 
component of this process.
The literature on advice networks has shown that especially within 
organizations, they are often shaped by a variety of influences, including 
the formal organizational chain or structure of the institution itself, and 
the normative orientation of members, to which we need to add in our 
case, pressures from corporate interests. Along these lines, our study of 
joint regulation focuses on how these three factors contribute to shaping 
the advice network at the court, with the idea that advice networks affect 
the normative orientation of the court and eventually its decisions.
Fieldwork at the Commercial Court of Paris
Fieldwork was conducted at the Commercial Court of Paris in 2000, 2002, 
and 2005. This court is one of the largest in France and handles around 
12 per cent of all the commercial litigation in the country. It includes 21 
chambers, some generalist and other specialized. The main distinction is 
between bankruptcy and litigation chambers, but many sub- specialties 
also exist (for example unfair competition, European law, multimedia and 
new technologies, and so on). Judges rotate yearly across chambers; each 
chamber has a president who reports to the president of the court.
Data on advice seeking among judges were collected at all three waves 
with the following name generator:
Here is the list of all your colleagues at this Court, including the President and 
Vice- Presidents of the Court, the Presidents of the Chambers, the judges, and 
‘wisemen’. Using this list, could you check the names of colleagues whom you 
have asked for advice during the last two years concerning a complex case, or 
with whom you have had basic discussions, outside formal deliberations, in 
order to get a different point of view on this case.10
A very high response rate (over 80 per cent) enabled us to reconstitute 
the complete advice network among judges at this courthouse at each of 
the three waves. We also collected data about judges’ attributes, most 
notably their professional and educational backgrounds as well as their 
formal position and tenure at the court.
In 2005, we included a set of new questions on how judges use their 
business experience to accomplish their tasks. Our goal was to identify 
some of the norms, customs and practices on which they rely on in 
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order to make decisions, particularly when they can use their discretion-
ary authority.11 This is a difficult question because judges tend to say 
little about their work in order to protect their independence. To get 
around this difficulty, we used a jurisprudential method asking judges 
to comment on decisions made by other courts. These cases were delib-
erately chosen in areas where the law does not provide any clear- cut 
solution and judges must use their personal appreciation, a form of 
assessment that potentially calls upon norms and practices they may have 
learned in their industry of origin. In other words, we aimed to mobilize 
the judges’ discretionary power in order to identify different collective 
tendencies.
Variation in responses is not surprising in itself since we intentionally 
chose cases allowing for a great deal of discretion. What interests us first 
and foremost is the extent to which variation in assessments drives the 
evolution of collective learning at this court, and thus indirectly influences 
decisions. We measure this effect by looking at the extent to which sharing 
assessments drive the evolution of the advice network among judges. We 
focus in this chapter on a specific case: that of litigation between major-
ity shareholders represented by the board of a company and minority 
shareholders over the right of the latter to delay an Extraordinary General 
Assembly in which the board wanted to recapitalize the firm. The interest 
of this case is that, insofar as judges were asked to evaluate the decisions of 
a board, it measures their interventionism in the operations of a company, 
thereby capturing an important aspect of this form of joint governance of 
the economy. This case is presented below.
DEALING WITH CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE 
BOARD AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
The case we used refers to specific clauses of the New Code of Civil 
Procedure (article 873, paragraph one, number 10), about judges’ power 
to stop ‘obviously illicit trouble’. The minority shareholders of a company 
asked a commercial court to postpone an Extraordinary General Assembly 
and to appoint an expert to check the refinancing operation decided by 
the board. Judges have discretionary power as two potentially conflict-
ing principles inform French corporate law in this area: on the one hand, 
courts have the mission to protect the collective interest of the company 
(its survival) independently of the parties, but on the other hand, they 
should not interfere with its management. With this in mind, we asked 
Parisian commercial judges to comment on the following judgment (see 
Box 3.1), published by another French court.
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BOX 3.1  WITH RESPECT TO MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO DELAY 
AN EXTRAORDINARY GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY
The shareholders in the minority group (from here on designated 
‘the Plaintiffs’) of a company (from here on designated ‘the 
Company’) looking to decrease then reconstitute its own capital, 
which has become inferior to half its original amount, are suing 
the Company in emergency proceedings.
The Plaintiffs ask for an emergency ruling from the President 
of the Court, first that he postpone sine die the Extraordinary 
General Assembly meant to carry out this recapitalization, until 
an expert report is made available on why the capital of the firm 
has become inferior to half its original amount; and second that 
he designate an expert to investigate the financial situation of the 
Company, in particular:
● The state of its losses,
● The value of its assets and shares,
● The value of the Plaintiffs’ participation in the Company.
The Plaintiffs also want the appointed expert to give his opinion 
about the appropriateness of the financial operations examined 
in the board’s report and about the schedule proposed by board 
executives for these operations.
The President of the Court decides that the conditions required 
for designating a management expert are met because:
●  The CEO of the Company had a personal interest in the 
operation and made a decision as an executive of the 
Company;
●  The Company failed to communicate specific information to 
the Plaintiffs in response to their questions.
Furthermore, the Court states that bringing in an expert is in 
the interest of all shareholders, whether or not they belong to 
the majority. In addition, the Court considers that some of the 
claims that the Plaintiffs make against the Company are valid, in 
particular:
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Cases of this type are quite frequent at the Commercial Court of Paris 
every year, notably at the end of June, when companies must have their 
general assemblies. Postponement is risky for a company. In this case 
minority shareholders wonder if they will have to reach for their wallets 
even if they are not required to participate in the recapitalization opera-
tion, or see the value of their shares decrease. One judge speaks of the 
minority shareholders’ worries vis- à- vis the majority:
[I]t’s also a matter of knowing whether the majority shareholders are suddenly 
reducing their capital in order to bring in new shareholders, if in reality there 
are ulterior motives behind the operation. The supposed increase of capital 
would be made to get rid of the minorities and to gain control without them. In 
this case, if the transaction only tries to exclude the minorities, it would be an 
abuse of power by the board. If it is not a hidden entrance of a third party, the 
case is then limited to a quieter hypothesis.
Three- quarters of the consular magistrates responded that they would 
have made the same decision as the president of this court concerning 
the designation of an expert. The same proportion would have post-
poned the general assembly. Here are excerpts of interviews justifying 
this decision:
Minority shareholders have the right to ask questions, and we need to answer 
them in a very precise manner. If this isn’t done, first of all it’s a mistake. 
Secondly, a judge can’t determine everything immediately. Why, because if you 
have to look at two years worth of balance sheets . . . you need time. We can’t 
rule with the few elements we have. So I’d almost say, at the beginning, you’d 
need to bring in a finance expert who could look at all of that, who’d analyze 
the reports of the Commissaire aux Comptes, to find out if the procedure was 
properly carried out, if management did everything that there is to do . . . So it’s 
crucial to appoint an expert.
● The shareholder pact seems not to have been respected;
● The modalities of capital operations, notably the fact that 
the incorporation of reserves began after the reduction of 
capital, following an increase in capital in cash, seems not 
to have been clearly justified.
Taking all these elements into consideration, the President 
of the Court decides to postpone the Extraordinary General 
Assembly and selects an expert to report on the management of 
the Company.
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 Business obeys a type of mathematical science: game theory. When the CEO 
of a company is attacked like that, he’s got to know about it beforehand. Or 
he’s a bad president. The judge knows that he knows. . . . [T]he judge says to 
himself: ‘We know that you know, buddy. You took a risk.’ He’s the one who 
managed things badly, it’s not our intervention of justice. The guy willingly 
made a mistake and the expert will make a decision about it.
The fact that most judges would have made the same decision and pushed 
back the Extraordinary General Assembly does not however constitute a 
systematic defence of minority groups:
There’s an article in the Code that allows minorities to ask for what they call a 
minority assessment. And the Appeals Court is even more lax than we are. In 
one important case, an association of shareholders that was far from holding 
five per cent, asked for minority assessment. They based their demand on a very 
general article stating that one can ask for an assessment before attaining five 
per cent. We refused with the reasoning: we don’t want to base our decision on 
a far- reaching general article that could end up short- circuiting a statute for a 
very unique case. But for us: ‘you have the 5 per cent, you have precise ques-
tions, we accept the assessment’.
The minority of judges who would not have come to the same conclu-
sion as the court do not distinguish themselves from the others in relation 
to their seniority in the institution, their type of activity, or their degrees. 
Their arguments reveal a relationship to the law and to judges’ compe-
tences that deserves further analysis:
No, we would have said: did your assembly meet regularly? That’s the only 
thing that we need to look at, and when it’s been considered, if the elements 
that need to be provided are not the right ones, we’d have to take it back. But 
not before, we don’t need to intervene in the management of a company, except 
to enforce procedural rules. . . . If the majority decides to make this transaction 
[re-capitalization], with the quorum and the conditions of validity, if the others 
suffer losses they can sue for damages. But we wouldn’t say the Court has the 
power to postpone a general assembly. It’s a big deal!
 It’s better to hold the EGA as soon as possible so that the capital itself can be 
reconstituted. If I’d been judge we would have demanded a written communica-
tion of the Commissaire aux Comptes’ last two reports for the last two years . . . 
[D]oes he think it’s useful and necessary to postpone? If not, we need to hold the 
EGA immediately. We’re risking bankruptcy.
 Luckily it’s rare that just any small shareholder asks for an expert because 
he doesn’t know what’s happened in the company! Subject to all this, the 
demand seems excessive to me and even a little paralyzing. In any case you have 
to have an EGA . . . Maybe the small shareholders didn’t want to follow the 
increase of capital and they decided to wage war against the big shareholders. 
But in this case you would sell your shares! It’s the type of initiative that you 
definitely shouldn’t encourage and multiply! At any moment, anyone can block 
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the functioning of a company. In the case of embezzlement or fraud, we would 
understand. Is this really well founded or is it petty vengeance against a director 
with whom we can’t sympathize coming from where, about what?
 As soon as the magistrates leave the specific case to examine more general 
principles and to respond to the question of whether they should give 
 preference to the common interest of a company, consensus disappears. Nearly 
the majority shares this opinion (46 per cent), while a quarter is hostile to it (22 
per cent); the rest are hesitant (21 per cent) or refuse to answer (10 per cent). 
The fact that 22 per cent do not wish to give preference to the collective inter-
est of the firm shows that the question of governance is very easily politicized.
 The Court makes its verdicts based on the law. If the little guy’s right, he gets 
the favourable solution. Survival of the company in itself is not a goal if it’s 
at the expense of shareholders because by that logic it would be like favouring 
tenants over landlords, like in the USSR, where it was the State. We give ver-
dicts to say who’s wrong. If they come to the Court, it’s because they already 
believe that in this conflict the survival of the company is at stake.
Notice that judges with a law degree and who belong to the banking and 
financial sector differ slightly from their colleagues in their appreciation 
of the decision of the court. They are more inclined to favour the collec-
tive interest of a company than the others, and less hostile to interven-
tion in the management of a company, so that they tend to have a more 
‘pro- intervention’ position than the rest of judges. We see the opposite 
for judges from the construction industry: they tend to adopt a less ‘pro- 
intervention’ attitude than the rest of the judges in litigation opposing the 
shareholders of a company.
MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
The outcome variable in our study is the selection of advice ties by judges, 
and we focus on the evolution over time of the network composed by these 
ties. We use the stochastic actor- oriented approach of Snijders (2001), with 
the software Siena version four, a package in the R statistical environ-
ment (Ripley and Snijders, 2010). The model postulates that the existing 
network structure has effects on changes in selection of advisors, specifies 
these effects, and takes into account interdependence between ties. (For a 
more extensive treatment, see Snijders 2001, 2005; Snijders et al., 2010).
Model Specification
The model presents the evolution of the network from its state at the first 
observation to that observed at the second observation, and likewise the 
development from the second to the third observation, and so on. This 
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evolution is presented as consecutive changes of advisor choice, which can 
be of three types: (1) creation of new ties (that is new advisor choices); (2) 
termination of existing ties (that is dropping advisors); or (3) maintenance 
of existing ties. These changes are assumed to occur sequentially between 
the observations, and actors are assumed to be aware of them and thus to 
have knowledge of the changing network. This first- order approximation 
is reasonable as the commercial court is a relatively small institution com-
posed of about 150 members at each moment in time. Each of the changes 
of advisor is regarded as a choice made by the judge requesting advice. 
The probability distribution of these choices is modelled as being depend-
ent on the so- called objective function, which is a function of the personal 
network of the member making the current choice.
Probabilities of change are higher toward network states having a 
higher value of the objective function; thus, the objective function can be 
loosely regarded as representing the attractiveness of the network, as seen 
from the viewpoint of the member concerned. The objective function is a 
linear combination of terms called ‘effects’, similar to the linear predictor 
in generalized linear modelling. The weights of these effects are the param-
eters in the statistical model, and are estimated from the data. Each effect 
represents a component potentially driving the network dynamics.
To state the model formally, suppose there are i = 1, 2, . . . , n actors 
and call Xij the potential tie from actor i to actor j, which may have value 
0 (absence) or 1 (presence). Assume that with a given frequency, actor 
i is given an opportunity to change from Xij to 1 2 Xij. Furthermore, 
assume that actor i makes changes that maximize its objective function 
 fi (b, x(i S j) ) (where x is a matrix representing the whole network of 
ties, b is a vector of statistical parameters, and x(i S j)  is the state of 
the network when Xij becomes 1 2 Xij), plus a random disturbance with 
Gumbel distribution, as in random utility models. Under these condi-
tions, the probability that such a change occurs is:
 pij(b, x) 5
exp(fi(b, x(i S j) ) )
an
h51
exp(fi(b, x(i S h) ) )
This is the multinomial logit form of a random utility model. The sta-
tistical inference aims to estimate the parameters b, which indicate the pre-
ferred direction of changes, by a generalized method of moments.
Some of the parameters refer to endogenous effects that depend on 
the network itself: they represent dependency between network ties and 
account for path- dependency in network evolution. Others are related 
to exogenous effects and depend on the characteristics of the member 
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making the choice and/or the member chosen. The model specification 
consists of specifying both the endogenous and the exogenous effects that 
are hypothesized to drive the dynamics of the network. This specification 
must include effects reflecting the hypotheses but also effects reflecting 
other mechanisms thought to drive network dynamics, in order to rule out 
alternative explanations (similar to control variables in regression models) 
and to provide a good model fit so that the standard errors of the param-
eter estimates are reliable.
Estimation Methodology
The effects included in the model are meant to explain network change, 
that is, the selection of advice ties by judges. Let us start with endogenous 
effects which, as mentioned earlier, account for path- dependency and 
can be regarded as controls, necessary to understand the dynamics of the 
network.
To begin with, we control for the effect of local sub- structures which are 
well known in the social networks literature to be likely drivers of the evo-
lution of networks. Reciprocity captures the tendency for an actor to form 
an advice tie with those who seek advice from him or her, and is reflected 
in the objective function by the number of mutual ties of each given actor 
i. The transitive triplets effect refers to the propensity to seek advice from 
one’s advisor’s advisor, and is defined by the number of transitive patterns 
in actor i’s relations, that is, ordered pairs of actors (j, h) to both of whom 
i is tied, while j is also tied to h. The three- cycle effect captures a tendency 
for the formation of short cycles of generalized exchange and depends 
on the number of three- cycles in i’s personal advice relationships, that is, 
cycles in which i seeks advice from j, j from k, and k from i. The conjunc-
tion of a positive transitive triplets effect accompanied by a negative three- 
cycles effect may be regarded as a form of local hierarchy in advice.
In addition, we control for global structures depending on degrees. In 
social network analysis, in- degrees measure the number of incoming ties, 
and in- degree centrality captures the extent to which a judge is identified 
by others as one of their advisors; it can be interpreted as a form of popu-
larity or status. Conversely, out- degrees measure the number of outgoing 
ties, and out- degree centrality is the number of advisors of a judge. These 
measures are relevant because the distribution of both in- and out- degrees 
is highly skewed in this particular network (Lazega et al., 2008, 2010a) 
and must be controlled adequately in order to obtain a good model fit. 
As proposed in Snijders et al. (2010), we include three degree- related 
effects relating to, respectively, the dispersion (variance) of in- degrees, the 
association (correlation) between in- and out- degrees and the dispersion 
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(variance) of the out- degrees. First, in- degree popularity (sqrt) is defined 
as the sum of the square roots of in- degrees of a judge’s advisors; a posi-
tive parameter for this effect indicates that judges with higher in- degrees 
are more attractive as advisors, and hence indicates a self- reinforcing effect 
leading to high dispersion of in- degrees. The square roots are used because 
we assume that a higher in- degree increases attractiveness of an advisor 
(monotonicity), but its impact becomes lower at higher values of the in- 
degree (decreasing marginal effect). Second, out- degree popularity (sqrt) 
is the sum of the square roots of out- degrees of a judge’s advisors. When 
this effect is positive, judges with higher out- degrees are more attractive 
as advisors, resulting in a relatively high association between in- degrees 
and out- degrees. Again, the use of a square root measure presumes that 
differences between high out- degrees are relatively less important than 
the same differences between low out- degrees. Third, out- degree activity 
(sqrt) is defined as the out- degree of a judge times the square root of his/
her own out- degree. If its parameter is positive, judges who currently ask 
many others for advice will have – compared to those who ask few others 
for advice – a relatively stronger tendency to add a new advisor rather 
than drop an old advisor. This is, again, a self- reinforcing effect: a positive 
parameter will lead to increased dispersion of out- degrees. In a previous 
paper (Lazega et al., 2010a) we interpreted degree- related effects as indi-
cators of status that, over time, sustain the centrality of judges with high 
in- degrees and low out- degrees.
Notice that the in- degrees and out- degrees have the dual role of inde-
pendent variables, and reflections of the dependent variables, that is the tie 
changes. This raises no logical issues because these two roles are separated 
in the dynamic model that we use: at any moment in time the current in- 
degrees are among the predictors for creation of new ties and maintenance 
of existing ties. Such a dual role is characteristic of models with feedback.
We also include exogenous variables, that is attributes of actors or pairs 
of actors. For the actor- level variables, we estimate the following basic 
three effects (see Snijders et al., 2010): ego effects to account for their 
advice- seeking behaviour, alter effects for being sought out for advice and 
similarity effects. A positive ego parameter would indicate that judges 
with these characteristics have a greater tendency to seek advice than 
others; a positive alter parameter would indicate that others have a greater 
tendency to seek advice from such judges; and a positive similarity effect 
would indicate that judges who are similar with respect to this attribute 
(both having it or both not having it) have a higher tendency to seek advice 
from each other.
The main variable of interest is judges’ view of the case of share-
holder conflict presented above, which we take as an indicator of their 
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interventionism in boards; we represent it as a dummy variable. The other 
important variable of interest is the professional and educational back-
ground of judges. In line with the above discussion, we distinguish those 
from the banking and financial industry, and with legal education, from 
all others.
As a control, we also include judges’ seniority, that is, number of years 
spent at the court, a proxy for position in the hierarchy: indeed some 
roles such as president of chamber can only be awarded to judges who 
have at least eight years of experience at the court. Another organiza-
tional aspect that we control for is chamber co- membership at the time 
of fieldwork and chamber co- membership during previous years, reflect-
ing the division of labour in the court and the fact that two judges who 
are, or were in the past, in the same chamber are likely to have closer 
or more frequent contacts, and this may be reflected in their choice of 
advisors. Technically, chamber co- membership and previous chamber 
co- membership are changing dyadic variables, for which the changes keep 
track of new co- memberships between the first and the second periods of 
observation (2000–2002 and 2002–2005 respectively).
Parameter Estimates
Table 3.1 presents our results. We use a large dataset including all judges 
who were present at the court at least once in 2000, 2002 or 2005, plus 
those who were ‘wisemen’ in these years. This is a network with changing 
composition, whose members are partly renewed every year as judges who 
have finished their mandate leave and are replaced by newcomers, with 
a turnover of about 10 per cent. In this sense, this model is an extension 
of our previous work which only relied on the subset of judges who were 
present at all three waves (Lazega et al., 2008, 2010a). We fit the model 
separately for the two periods (2000–2002 and 2002–2005) to take into 
account differences in composition, average degree and other network 
characteristics over the waves, which might otherwise impair the quality 
of estimates (Lospinoso et al., 2010). This is needed all the more as the 
degree distribution in our dataset is much more skewed, thus leading to 
higher centralization, in Period One than in Period Two (Lazega et al., 
2006; 2010b).
The rate parameter accounts for the amount of change between two 
subsequent observations of the network, that is, the speed at which the 
dependent variable (the network) changes. All other parameters are coef-
ficients of the objective function or network evaluation function, used to 
compare different states of the network when the actor makes a choice 
to maintain present ties, to add a new tie, or to delete an existing tie. If 
Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13025 - EE - UGUR:M2691 - UGUR PRINT
 Norms, advice networks and joint economic governance  63
Graham HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:13025 - EE - UGUR:M2691 - UGUR PRINT
a parameter value is nil, the corresponding effect does not drive network 
dynamics; if it is positive, then there will be a higher probability of moving 
toward a personal network where the corresponding variable has a higher 
value; and the opposite if it is negative.
Among endogenous structural effects, the density effect is a basic indi-
cator of network density and can be interpreted as an intercept. At local 
level the reciprocity effect is not always significant and does not allow con-
cluding that judges tend to seek advice from those who themselves sought 
advice from them. The transitive triplets effect is positive and significant 
while the three- cycles effect is not consistently significant over time, so that 
we cannot conclude that there is local hierarchy in advice.
Endogenous feedback mechanisms at global rather than local level are 
captured through degree- related effects. We include in- degree popularity, 
Table 3.1  Bankers’ norms drive the evolution of the advice network among 
lay judges at the Commercial Court of Paris (Siena model)
Period One 
(2000–2002)
Period Two 
(2002–2005)
Estimate Standard 
error
Estimate Standard 
error
Rate parameter 31.9 2.61 21.53 0.96
Out- degree (density) –4.29* 0.28 –3.3* 0.25
Reciprocity 0.56* 0.16 0.36 0.22
Transitive triplets 0.14* 0.04 0.19* 0.03
3- cycles –0.19* 0.1 −0.03 0.05
In- degree – popularity (sqrt) 0.4* 0.02 0.34* 0.02
Out- degree – popularity (sqrt) –0.19* 0.1 –0.19* 0.1
Out- degree – activity (sqrt) 0.38* 0.04 0.08* 0.04
Chamber co- membership 1.21* 0.08 1.68* 0.09
Previous chamber co- membership 0.8* 0.08 0.25* 0.1
BankLaw alter 0.14* 0.07 0.09 0.08
BankLaw ego –0.18* 0.08 –0.25* 0.08
BankLaw similarity 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08
Seniority alter 0.04* 0.01 –0.01 0.01
Seniority ego 0.01 0.01 –0.03* 0.01
Seniority similarity 0.12 0.23 –0.22 0.29
Interventionism in Boards alter 0.15* 0.06 0.13* 0.05
Interventionism in Boards ego 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.05
Interventionism in Boards  
 similarity
0.01 0.09 0.03 0.07
Note: *statistically significant at 5 per cent level.
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out- degree popularity and out- degree activity, all in square root form. In- 
degree popularity is positive and statistically significant: it is evidence of 
a self- reinforcing process in which judges who are central at a given point 
in time see their centrality grow more strongly than others. Out- degree 
popularity is negative and suggests that judges with high out- degrees are 
less sought for advice, and the system moves towards a relatively low cor-
relation between in- and out- degrees. Finally, out- degree activity is posi-
tive and significant (though more strongly so in the first than in the second 
period), suggesting that those who seek much advice remain in this role, 
and that the dispersion of out- degrees becomes or remains relatively high.
Regarding the exogenous variables, it is clear that chamber co- 
membership plays an important role in shaping the advice network, as 
already pointed out in our previous studies (Lazega et al., 2006, 2008). 
Previous chamber co- memberships also matter, even though their effect is 
smaller in size, indicating that some ties are lost with job rotation. Most 
of the other parameters exhibit time heterogeneity and do not display the 
same tendency over time. For instance, bankers with a law degree are 
particularly attractive as advisors in Period One (positive and statistically 
significant alter effect), but not in Period Two; their own advice- seeking 
behaviour is no different from that of other judges in Period One, but they 
tend to consult others less in Period Two (negative and significant ego 
effect). Likewise, more senior judges are attractive advisors in Period One 
but not afterwards, while the tendency of seniors not to seek advice from 
those more junior than themselves is only detectable in Period Two. These 
differences seem largely due to the changing composition of the network: 
indeed, senior judges and bankers- lawyers appear to remain consist-
ently differentially attractive as advisors over time when only the sub- set 
of judges who responded to the survey at all three waves is considered 
(Lazega et al., 2008, 2010a).
Interestingly, however, the ‘Interventionism in Boards’ alter param-
eter is positive and statistically significant over the two periods, thereby 
suggesting that judges who shared the decision to postpone the General 
Assembly and to appoint an expert have a consistently higher tendency 
to be consulted by others, so that their in- degree centrality becomes, or is, 
relatively high. Instead, the ego and similarity parameters are not signifi-
cant. Hence, consensus on this choice contributes to driving the evolution 
of the advice network among judges at the Commercial Court of Paris and 
can be considered as a likely determinant of its final regulatory and judi-
cial orientations. Since bankers with a law degree tend to be more inter-
ventionists in boards, on average, than the other judges, it is very likely 
that it is their influence that is being measured here with this effect. Thus 
the dominance of bankers- lawyers – through their interventionist views 
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with respect to boards, rather than through their sheer presence – extends 
to the court as a whole.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have discussed a form of joint governance of the 
economy in which the government delegates important functions to civil 
society – here representatives of business acting as lay judges at a truly 
judicial commercial court. We outlined how this arrangement, despite its 
advantages in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of the conflict resolution 
process, entails the risk that particular industry interests prevail over the 
general interest. In particular it is known that the financial and banking 
sector as well as, to a lesser extent, the construction and services industries 
take strong action to ensure that their interests are taken into account.
Yet consular courts are complex structures in which sheer representa-
tion of the interests of specific sectors does not per se lead to dominance 
of these sectors. Final outcomes depend also upon the organizational 
features of the court, that is its structure in chambers and its internal hier-
archy, and on the normative orientations of its members – in particular, 
we focused here on judges’ pro- interventionist view in matters of company 
management at the board level. We investigated how these factors contrib-
ute to shaping the advice network at the court, that is the channels through 
which knowledge, norms, ideas and guidance circulate. The interest of this 
approach is that it confirms that advice networks affect the overall norma-
tive orientation of the court, and eventually its decisions.
Our Siena model provides evidence that adherence to a pro- 
interventionist (in boards) view is a driver of the evolution of the advice 
network. This is consistent with the observation that most judges agreed 
with the decision to accept the request of minority shareholders that they 
were asked to comment as a jurisprudential case. Despite variation in their 
answers, they find pro- interventionist colleagues more attractive as advi-
sors, and do so consistently over time. The only other clear trend is, among 
organisational variables, chamber and previous chamber co- membership 
as a consistently strong driver of network dynamics.
However, the fieldwork suggests that differences in opinion remain 
strong and that, although judges agreed on the particular case they com-
mented, they were not all ready to generalize it and protect minority 
shareholders in all circumstances. Further, there were nuances in judges’ 
appreciation even of the most consensual answer, owing largely to the 
sector of activity of origin as bankers appeared more inclined to interven-
tionism in boards than executives from the building industry.
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These results support a sociological interpretation of joint governance 
as a multifaceted system, in which particular industries can have an influ-
ence not only by sending many judges in, but also more subtly by exerting 
persuasion through informal advice ties. They shed light on some of the 
risks of institutional capture (Lazega, 2009) attached to such an institu-
tional design, but also on the complexity of the concept of joint govern-
ance of markets.
As underlined by Dixit (2009), governance equilibria identified in 
theory by many economists can fall short of social optimality for many 
reasons. Our findings show that ‘joint governance’, not to mention ‘self 
governance’ or Dixit’s ‘private- ordering governance institutions’, can 
also represent suboptimal solutions with respect to public interest. Even 
official governance institutions that are efficient in terms of speed can be 
suspected of harbouring conflicts of interests with private intermediaries. 
Our case study shows that, when contributing to official enforcement in 
governance, business relies on its most powerful segments (representa-
tives of the banking industry for example) that act as a third party and 
distort such enforcement in invisible ways to suit its own interests rather 
than social welfare. Therefore, we conclude by pointing to the possibility 
that relation- based and rule- based modes of governance can be combined 
in suboptimal ways that allow certain parties to ‘cheat’ more easily, 
to protect their rent and power or to double cross any other party in a 
 conflict – simply by knowing that privately- selected officials acting as third 
parties are socially closer and intellectually more sensitive to these private 
interests.
NOTES
 1. Since Max Weber’s study of the German nineteenth century Börse (2000[1924]), 
organizational sociologists’ works on economic institutions have greatly contributed 
to economic sociology. Some of them, such as Baker (1984) in his study of the Chicago 
Options Exchange, have added a structural spin to organizational approaches (White, 
2002; Swedberg, 1994).
 2. Arbitration also exists as a formal avenue of conflict resolution for businesses, but 
it is usually much more expensive and therefore limited to large and multinational 
companies.
 3. For the characteristics of the French system of commercial courts as an institution of 
combined external and self- regulation, see Chaput (2002), Hirsch (1985), Ithurbide 
(1970), Jean (2000), Szramkiewicz (1989). There are 191 commercial courts in France, 
around 3,000 consular judges making approximately 300,000 judicial decisions each 
year, of which 50,000 concern insolvency issues (Ministry of Justice figures for 1998; 
www.justice.gouv.fr/publicat/tc1807.htm (accessed 10 June 2010).
 4. Two months after we began fieldwork, French commercial courts went on strike, for 
the first time in their history, against a proposed 2001 reform of their system. At the 
Commercial Court of Paris, we were surprised to see so many judges haunting the 
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corridors of the building during weeks of strike: many were retired, ‘all dressed up with 
no place to go’ as their younger colleagues said.
 5. The state strives to increase its control. Since 1981, the attorney general has had an 
office at the court and is allowed to participate in deliberations, especially in bankruptcy 
proceedings. In 2001, a draft law was debated in the National Assembly and the Senate 
which aimed at introducing professional judges in the midst of consular judges, as a 
means to reassure businesses involved in court proceedings by improving ‘control over 
the controllers’. The reform eventually failed but is indicative of a paradoxical situa-
tion. It was when the state began to withdraw from direct control of the economy in the 
1980s that it started its attempts to increase its presence in commercial courts. The justi-
fication for this change in policy is to reassure European and global investors that they 
will receive a fair treatment in French commercial courts. This explanation, however, 
must be taken with caution: in spite of decades of selling its holdings, the French state’s 
direct ownership in the economy remains strong.
 6. Source: Labour force survey (Enquête Emploi) 2000, Institut national de la statistique et 
des études économiques (INSEE).
 7. Source: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), Mensuel 
no. 202, October 2001, Ile- de- France: ‘Gros plan sur l’emploi francilien en 1999’.
 8. Source: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), National 
Accounts, 2001 (www.insee/fr/indicateur/cnat_annu/tableaux/t_1201_25_4.htm 
(accessed 20 June 2010).
 9. The question is whether this represents social capital at the macro level, for society as 
a whole. One may argue that it is the case as with consular courts, civil society par-
ticipates in the political process and in the life of institutions; the existence of virtuous 
knowledge- sharing processes would reinforce this view. However, others may contend 
that social capital in consular courts may in fact promote the particular interests of 
some industries and business organisations, rather than the general interest.
10. Wisemen are judges whose mandate has ended but remain available as advisors for 
other judges.
11. In the French legal system, this discretion is called pouvoir souverain d’appréciation.
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